

THE PRESENT

178 George Haddad has recently summarized in some detail the changes which have occurred in Lebanon (and Syria) in the past half century. His emphasis is on material and institutional changes: "Syria and Lebanon have known a real revolution in transport in the last 30 years with the appearance of automobiles (3 in 1914, about 12,000 in 1945). . . . In less than half a century, the urban centers of Syria and Lebanon have changed from medieval towns to modern cities." (Haddad, 1950, pp. 140, 146.)

[494] It is unfortunate that Haddad does not deal at all with the problems, psychological and otherwise, which these revolutionary changes have created. Implicitly, however, he recognizes that change has not directly affected all aspects of life in equal measure: "The traits for which the Syrian Arab and the oriental in general has been known: sense of honor, strict morals, manliness, courage, loyalty, hospitality, reverence of old age, strength of family ties, have not changed much" (*ibid.*, pp. 186-87.) Gibb has phrased the matter somewhat differently: "But in the Near East the changes have not been homogeneous; they have often followed from a violent breach in the continuity of economic and intellectual life and the interference of an external system; they have seldom and only exceptionally embraced even a majority of the population; and therefore old and new have frequently gone on existing, and still go on existing side by side [our italics]." (Gibb, 1942a, p. 35.) Let us see how these generalizations can be applied to Munsif.

MATERIAL CHANGES


291 As we observed, Westernization in clothes has been very noticeable, though not complete. In this respect, Munsif appears to be more acculturated than the Egyptian community partially reported upon recently by Lichtenstadter (1952, p. 382), in which the people wear traditional clothes in the village and at all times except when in a wholly acculturative situation such as, for example, working in a modern office. Those Munsifiin who have adopted Western clothes wear them at all times. In the younger people who are city workers, there is even a tendency to look down on those who wear all or part of the traditional costume because of its connotation of peasant status. But their tendency to reject *both* traditional and European headgear, also noted in Palestine by Patai (1947, p. 22), can be taken as a symbol of the culture conflict which they are undergoing. Also very noticeable is the Westernization of household and personal equipment—furniture, cooking utensils, wristwatches, flashlights, and so on.

177 These types of material acculturation seem to have taken place under the following conditions:

1. The change does not involve excessive expense.
2. The change is clearly conducive to greater comfort and convenience.

PATTERNS OF ACCULTURATION IN AL-MUNSHIF

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LEGEND

- CULTURE ELEMENTS BEFORE WESTERNIZATION
- SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
- CHANGES EXTERNAL TO VILLAGE
- NEW FACTORS IN THE VILLAGE CULTURE
- DIRECTIONS OF INFLUENCE
- POTENTIALLY DISRUPTIVE FORCES
- ACTUALLY DISRUPTIVE FORCES

FIG. 7

621 2. Probably more significant, however, is the fact that the lack of preference
 613 for lineage endogamy is but one point of evidence for the general tendency in
 582 the village toward de-emphasis of the individual minimal lineages as formal institutions. The other points of evidence on this matter are: (a) a minimum of lineage *masb'a* (communal) landholdings; (b) clique-groups cross-cutting lineage lines; (c) rarity, and perhaps absence, of lineage feuds; (d) lack of apparent interest in lineage names; (e) marriage prohibition crosscuts lineage lines in Sphere 1; (f) emphasis on bilateral connections in Sphere 1.

This de-emphasis of individual minimal lineages does not indicate that there is a weakness in the adherence of the Munşifin to lineage (Sphere 2) values. Rather, it is a consequence of the fact that these values have been applied to the Core Group (i.e. the village) as a whole, and that this unit is, for the most part, a relatively stronger focus of identification than individual lineages are.

We have seen that structurally (whether by reason of actual development or of fictionalized conceptualization) the village is a single super-lineage, and that behavior is regarded to conform to this structural status, even in small details. (1) It is ideally, and still, for the most part, actually, endogamous. (2) When exogamous marriages do occur, outsider husbands are referred to by the term essentially reserved for a man who takes a wife from ego's lineage. (3) Individuals who are uncertain of all the maximal and minimal lineage affiliations are very certain of the over-all common descent. (4) Feuds are not only rare (as they must be within a lineage), but the villagers are proud of the fact. In terms of the concept of spheres, Munşif as a whole can be looked upon as an expanded segment of Sphere 2 (Lineage).

STABILITY AND CHANGE. CONCLUSION

178 During the course of this work, we have seen that acculturation has wrought
 182 severely disruptive changes in the village economy and significant changes in "ma-
 571 terial culture." In addition, it has created disconcerting conflicts in certain values, conflicts which remain unresolved. Yet it has had very little effect on the values and behavior associated with the community itself as an institution and as an in-group.

In seeking an explanation of this phenomenon of cultural persistence we have not chosen simply to dismiss it as an example of the "negative response" (Hallowell, 1945, p. 180) which is frequently encountered in culture contact situations. Rather, starting with the assumption that no particular cultural trait as such necessarily shows a peculiar resistance to change (Ogburn, 1930, p. 156), we have proceeded to the assumption that pre-existing configurations of traits may indeed prove to be barriers to change (Herskovits, 1945, p. 154).

We have presented a conceptual scheme of the basic social structure of the Middle East, an elaborate structure of in-groups within in-groups. This is a con-

signation of very far-reaching significance. We have found that while for the area as a whole, certain disruptions in these patterns have occurred and more are threatening, they have remained remarkably vigorous in Munqif. Why? 178
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We can now, at last, propose an answer to this question: In-group values and behavior in Munqif have remained forceful and alive because the village itself represents not just one of the structural spheres of the Middle East, but three of them, interlocking, and mutually supporting. In Munqif, Spheres 2 (Lineage) and 3 (Local Group) are coterminous, and these two are virtually coterminous with Sphere 5 (Sect). Each one of these spheres involves some of the most deep-seated and cherished values of Arab culture. The integration of three of them creates a cultural configuration which is highly resistant to change.

Such a structure cannot easily be undermined by direct attack. The increasing trend of village exogamy, for example—a violation of a well-established rule—does not seem to be associated with any devaluation of the village as an in-group, and so this behavior in itself is not, for has not so far been, a direct threat to the integrity of the village. However, if a new generation developed under urban acculturative influences, in which a large number of individuals were cut off from the affective ties and the values of the village and also prevented from developing new ties and values—if, in other words, a large number of village members developed anomic personalities—then the integrity of the village would very definitely be weakened because the values which now give, and always have given, rationale to its structure, would have ceased to be effective.

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Knowledge is gained by asking questions and then seeking the answers to 000
them. We began with a question. We have concluded with an answer; but this is an answer which is neither perfect in itself, nor is it complete, for it leads to a further question which we cannot answer here, but with which it is fitting that this work be ended:

In Hourani's words (1946, p. 39), how will it be possible for the villagers "by preserving or modifying the old and accepting what is new, once more to form a unified world of thought and life which they can call their own?"

621 seem to be fatalistically resigned to it. Others make contemptuous com-
 178 parisons between their forefathers, whom they picture as stalwart, hard-
 working yeomen, and the young people of today, who, they say, have gone
 soft. Still others believe that if only agriculture could be revitalized in
 the village, so as to be reasonably profitable, many of the present city
 workers would gladly return. This would require bringing irrigation water
 into the village in long-distance conduits.

621 On the other hand, the power of the village as a focus of local, religious,
 and kinship identity and solidarity, and hence of psychological and social
 178 security, continues to be forceful. This is revealed among the city dwellers
 142 in their strongly felt obligation to return to the village for important cere-
 monies and in their tendency to cling together in their social activities while
 in the city, almost as if they were a colony in an alien land.

621 The only apparent break in the strong social structure of the village is
 the increasing number of marriages to outsiders. Before 1920 such mar-
 178 riages were rare, and the outsiders, being women, were incorporated into
 142 the village. However, between 1920 and 1952, 30 percent (31) of the
 104 marriages contracted were to outsiders. Seventeen of these, as men-
 tioned before, involved village girls. Their children are lost to the village
 so far as membership is concerned. Thirteen of the 31 marriages were to
 coreligionaries, but 15 were to members of other Christian sects and 3 were
 to Muslims. So far, however, these external marriages do not appear to
 have had a deleterious effect on the concept of village unity.

621 In general, group problems still appear to be conceived as family prob-
 178 lems or village problems. And yet these people now work in and are de-
 pendent upon a larger society: the city and its institutions, and the nation.
 369 And these wider social groups have their problems which affect all.

The villager who lives and works in the city, in particular, is caught in
 a network of conflicting forces. His personal status and his strongest sense
 of belonging are still rooted in the village, but because of his education —
 and the more education he has, the more this is likely to be true — he has
 become unfitted, in terms of his interests and ambitions, to participate fully
 in village life. As it were, while his heart is in the village, his head and his
 hands are in the city. Out of economic necessity, he seeks his fortune in the
 city. But here, current conditions often prevent his finding work which is,
 in his eyes, suitable for a person of his educational status. Consequently,
 he is likely to be unable to participate in urban or extra-village social groups
 to an extent which is emotionally satisfying to him. Hence there is a ten-
 dency toward generalized dissatisfaction and cynicism.

In resolving this problem, it would be unwise to think in terms of the
 elimination or rejection of the bonds of village and kinship groups, for
 these are still fundamental factors in the morals, values, and emotional
 satisfactions of the people. Rather, the city dwellers need to identify them-

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off the mortgage or to reacquire the land sold. At present there are many among the old emigrants who refuse to sell the land they own back home, although they have lost the hope of ever returning to live there. 369/181

This attachment to the land and to the community life that has developed on it is one of the fundamentals of national existence. It contributes essential stability and continuity to national character, especially in times of crisis and change. There are, however, factors such as a faulty land-tenure system, lack of adequate credit facilities, and absentee landownership that have been threatening this basis of security in village life. Although most of the land in Lebanon is privately owned, held in fee simple either by the individual farmer or by the joint family group, in certain sections of the country, mostly outside the central mountain region, share cropping prevails. There is no doubt that this condition, associated in many cases with absentee ownership, has retarded agricultural development and resulted in an appreciably lower standard of living, especially in many of the villages of the Akkar plain and the Bika' valley. 369/183

Religious experience is another outstanding feature in the life of the rural folk of Lebanon. They take their religious organization, Christian or Moslem, seriously. Like their land and their agricultural activity, it constitutes a major part of their existence. Religion is not confined to formal services at the church or the mosque. It is expressed in wholesome recreation that takes place in connection with various festivals honoring patron saints. The Arabic word for festival, 'id, is the symbol of a rich cultural complex indicating joy, relaxation, sociability, and religious fervor. When the farmer refers to his land, crops, or animals, he invokes Allah's name and blessing. On certain occasions some of the season's produce is carried to the church to be blessed. The normal greeting between farmers at work is not "Good morning" or "Good evening," but rather "May Allah give you health and strength." 771/781

Furthermore, there is a striking identification of the religious organization with the local community. It is the people of the village who donate the land and erect the church or mosque building. The priest or imam is a member of the village, chosen 794

LEBANON

STH further complicating dissection is the Lebanon, the Sanjak of Lebanon and the districts which were added to it by the French to make the Lebanese Republic, and which had formerly been part of the vilayets of Beirut and Damascus. The inhabitants of the former are mainly Maronites, Druzes and Greek Catholics; the latter include Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics in all parts, Armenians in Beirut, Sunnis in the coastal towns, Shi'as in the south and the Beqaa. The former have a tradition—a political tradition of autonomy, a social tradition of feudalism, a tradition of religious tolerance—which binds them together and which was sufficiently strong to make the autonomous Sanjak function successfully; the latter, however, are not part of the Lebanese tradition and do not possess any common tradition of their own. In addition, at least one of the communities, the Sunnis, and important elements in most of the others, never wanted to be incorporated in Greater Lebanon. The tensions between these communities which are part of the real Lebanon and those which are not still continue.

French Policy

A State so deeply divided both in structure and in ideas as the Lebanese Republic and without any unifying national spirit could not continue to exist, at least in its present form, unless there were some external power controlling it closely and interfering continually in its affairs. Until 1943, this external control was provided by the Mandatory Power. Her policy was directed towards making Lebanon a bulwark of French influence. This aim had led to the creation of an independent Lebanon and the extension of its frontiers. It also inspired the attempts to maintain a Christian majority in spite of the extension of the frontiers and the more rapid increase of the Moslem population: this was one of the reasons for the settlement of the Armenian refugees around Beirut. Every attempt was made to attach the Christians more closely to France: by the rapid and systematic spread of French culture, by favouring the Christians in political and administrative matters and by playing upon their fears of Moslem persecution. An analogous appeal was made to the heterodox Moslems, although to a less extent; and even with the Sunnis an attempt was made to Gallicize them by means of education.

Among the Christians preference was given to the Uniates and more particularly to the Maronites, who regarded themselves and were generally regarded as the dominant element in the life of the

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Chapter 24

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

Two unique features of education in Lebanon distinguish it from education in the rest of the Arab world. Lebanon has the highest rate of literacy among the Arab states. It is estimated that between 70 and 75 percent of the children of primary-school age are attending school—a considerably higher rate than in the neighboring countries. This rate would have been higher had it not been for the addition to Lebanon after World War I of some regions which were much less advanced educationally than the original Mount Lebanon. Many village communities in Lebanon have what amounts to or approximates universal literacy. § 71²
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The second remarkable fact is that this comparatively advanced stage has been accomplished largely through the efforts of private and foreign schools rather than through publicly supported schools. Indeed, before World War I, autonomous Lebanon had only one public school, the Daudiyah at 'Aby, which was supported by the Lebanese government for the education of the children of that predominantly Druze region.¹ The private and foreign schools were largely sectarian. This gave education in Lebanon a predominantly sectarian character, emphasizing sectarian differences, the remnants and effects of which are felt to this day. 795
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Even in 1945-46 the number of pupils enrolled in the public schools was smaller than the number of those enrolled in either private schools or foreign schools. Higher education is conducted entirely in foreign institutions. Secondary education is shared between private and foreign schools, the Lebanese Ministry of National Education having no complete secondary schools. Primary education is conducted in all three types of schools—public, private, and foreign—with the public schools in the third place in enrollments. In addition to primary schools, the Ministry of Na-

¹ Government schools existed in those parts of the present Lebanese Republic which were parts of the neighboring Ottoman provinces. Among these were the cities of Beirut (now the capital of Lebanon), Tripoli, Sidon, and Tyre, as well as such districts as 'Akkar, Bshar, and Marjayoun.

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15,759 students. Armenian schools, both Orthodox and Protestant, come next with 50 schools and 8,213 pupils. They are followed by the Druses, with 26 schools and 1,545 pupils. 877^A
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A careful study of Table 90 shows that each denomination is catering almost exclusively to children of its own religion, though not necessarily of its own sect. Only 715 pupils out of the more than 21,000 in Maronite schools are non-Christian. Similarly, 385 pupils out of 10,479 in Greek Orthodox schools are non-Christian. Only 92 Christians, 162 Druses, and 97 pupils from various sects attend Muslim schools out of a total of 15,759. Thus, the sectarian differences already existing among the people of Lebanon are paralleled in the composition of the student bodies of the various private schools. It can perhaps be safely said that the schools help to perpetuate these cleavages, if not to make them more permanent. [12]

As a group the private schools represent no special philosophy of education or any attempt to experiment with new curriculums or methods. It is the rare school indeed which is trying to strike out in a new direction. Rather, the private schools follow the lead either of the French, American, or British types of education. Naturally, since the government conducts primary and secondary examinations, some schools also follow the program of studies set down by the government.

These statements must be qualified by two considerations. The first is the attempt of each sect to draw to its own schools the children of its own community, and annoyance lest these children may go to schools of a different sect. This is particularly true of the Greek Orthodox and Catholic sects. The same is true of some of the private Muslim schools which were established to prevent Muslim children entering Christian missionary schools where another religion might be taught to them, sometimes compulsionally, and where they would have no chance of studying their own religion. Some of the sectarian schools provide children for religious services in their churches, and the children are, themselves, taught the liturgy and hymns of their own church. In a large portion of the Catholic schools, the clergy is in full control, with nuns or priests as principals, directors of discipline and studies, and as teachers. The same is not true of the Greek Orthodox schools, though there is a close affiliation with the church. [770]

The second consideration is the new outlook advocated by some of the Lebanese that their culture should follow the lines of the so-called "Mediterranean culture." The protagonists of this theory maintain that Lebanon has always been a bridge between the East and the West and has always been influenced by Eastern and Western cultures alike. Whether in Phoenician, Greco-Roman, or Crusading times, Lebanon was always in direct 877^A
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